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Hunting Down a Lasting Relationship
with Canada—Will UNDRIP Help?
SARA MAINVILLE*
If Indigenous law is understood at the time of treaty-making, it will reinforce the procedural
aspects of dispute resolution through diplomacy and the settlement of “interpretative”
difficulties in living within a treaty relationship. The author, who is an Anishinaabe lawyer from
Treaty 3, recounts her understanding of how the treaty relationship was to be an experience
of using both Indigenous law and principles alongside Canadian law and principles to restore
relationships and treaty responsibilities. A Treaty 3 commitment to provide the “Queen’s
Government’s ear” to the Anishinaabe treaty partners is explored, along with the United
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples to examine if there are ways in law
and in relationship to have lasting and co-equal processes to live within Treaty in Canada. The
author also uses examples of recent litigation involving Treaty 3 to explain how section 35
treaty rights claims are an ill-suited remedy for living within treaty relationships in Canada.

*

Sara Mainville is a partner at Olthuis Kleer Townshend LLP in Toronto, Ontario and
is a member of the Anishinaabe Nation in Treaty 3. She held the position of Chief of
Couchiching First Nation in 2014 and just prior to that, as advisor to the Ogichidaakwe of
Grand Council Treaty 3. Sara has been practicing law since June 2005, and she greatly prefers
to study and practice Anishinaabe Inakonigaawin (Anishinaabe law) and other Indigenous
legal orders.
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ANISHINAABE AKI ARE THE lands known to my ancestors and relatives of the
Anishinaabe Nation along the boundary waters of Minnesota (Rainy Lake and
Lake of the Woods), in territory that would become Canada’s northwestern
Ontario and south-eastern Manitoba. Tese lands were harsh even for the
Anishinaabe, and the Dawson Route was the frst real agreement made between
the British and Anishinaabe to create the “white man’s road” which also required
British travellers to purchase Anishinaabe birch bark canoes and Anishinaabe
timber to feed steamboats that travelled along this pre-Confederation
passageway.1 Te Dawson expedition started a relationship of mutual beneft
and mutual co-existence in the period from 1860 to 1869. Tis was a decade of
relationship-building by people like Simon Dawson, who was an engineer who
had several encounters with the Anishinaabe before Treaty 3 was signed by him
and two other Treaty Commissioners on 3 October 1873. Teir knowledge and
understanding of the Anishinaabe were helpful in gaining the trust that the treaty
would be forever, a relationship of substance and diplomatic protocol between
the British and the Anishinaabe Nation along the boundary waters.
During litigation, courts have little time to hear the long recollections of
Anishinaabe storytellers. Other evidence must be brought forward at great expense
to bring some sort of understanding of these past treaty relationships. An example
of this problem is the decade of relationship skipped over in the following
introductory paragraph to Treaty 3 found in the Grassy Narrows decision:2
1.
2.

Sara J Mainville, “Treaty Councils and Mutual Reconciliation Under Section 35” (2007) 6
Indigenous LJ 141 at 151 [Mainville, “Treaty Councils”].
Grassy Narrows First Nations v Ontario (Natural Resources), 2014 SCC 48 at para 1
[Grassy Narrows].
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In the early 1870s, Canada was a young country looking to promote Western
expansion and Confederation. Settlers travelled west along an immigrant travel
route called the Dawson Route, and British Columbia agreed to join Confederation
on the condition that Canada build a transcontinental railway. But the immigrant
travel route and the prospective railway to the west ran through traditional Ojibway
land in what is now Northwestern Ontario and Eastern Manitoba. Canada was
concerned about the security of immigrant travellers and surveyors preparing for
the construction of the Canadian Pacifc Railway (“CPR”), and feared that it may
need to station troops in the area. Securing a safe route through the Ojibway lands
was critical for the addition of British Columbia to Confederation and to the
development of the West. It was against this historical backdrop that Treaty 3, which
is at the heart of this case, was negotiated.

Te Court does not mention the help and aid that was being shared between
the parties and the relationship being formalized through diplomatic protocols.
Tere is also no mention of the importance of this relationship for peaceful
co-existence in the ffty-fve thousand square miles that would be described in
the Articles of Treaty as Treaty 3 territory.
Whether or not Grassy Narrows First Nation had a treaty right to stop a
regional government from clear-cutting their traditional territories was at the
root of the litigation between the parties between 2003 to 2014. Te plaintifs
had to create a “theory of a case” beyond mere consultation and accommodation
that would permanently remedy the situation. Te problem of bringing a
nation-to-nation treaty into one nation’s domestic court system is a larger matter—
specifcally, what is the proper dispute resolution mechanism in nation-to-nation
treaties? Te two dialogues seem like counter-narratives, but they were linked in
our history of Anishinaabe protocols related to treaty enforcement. To be clear,
I am a member of a Treaty 3 community, I have studied the treaty both in law
school, through graduate studies, and by having several long conversations with
Treaty 3 knowledge holders. I am also a practicing lawyer who works with Treaty
3 clients. From 2008 to 2011, I was an advisor to the Grand Council and the
Grand Council Chief, Ogichidaakwe Diane M Kelly.3 I also have some personal
recollections of the eforts made by the Grand Council and infuential people in
the Grand Council from 1997 to 2014 to keep the treaty protocols consistent
with past customs.
My understanding of the Grand Council Treaty 3 is informed by the Treaty
3 Elders and some prominent leaders, most from the biizhew or lynx clan (my
grandmother’s clan). Te Grand Council has existed since we found the manomiin
3.

Te Government of the Anishinaabe Nation in Treaty #3, “Grand Council Treaty #3”,
online: Home <gct3.ca/>.
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(wild rice) at the height of land on a storied journey of the Anishinaabe from east
to west on Turtle Island. Te Grand Council met during the spring and summer
fsheries of Rainy River, Couchiching Falls, now more famous as the border
crossing between Fort Frances, Ontario and International Falls, Minnesota. Te
Grand Council is a meeting of four spiritual institutions (or houses), including
the Mitewewin society, and it is both a spiritual and political gathering of the
Anishinaabe people of the boundary waters. Ogichidaa, or “boundary warriors”
would lead the discussions of the Council, and a Grand Chief has always been
present, known in the early contact period with French explorers and fur
traders as “Nittum” meaning “frst” in Anishinaabemowin (the language of the
Anishinaabe) and “La Premier” in the French records.4 Tis Grand Council was
always present and I have heard about Ogichidaa in my family (Gus Mainville),
and of course in more well-known families from the Lake of the Woods area. Te
frst ofcial corporate organization was developed in the 1970s, and the Grand
Council Treaty 3 ofces were set up in a former residential school in what is now
present-day Kenora, Ontario.
It is an interesting position for a person that does not believe that my treaty
belongs in a domestic court to be writing an article about the recent litigation
history of Treaty 3. My legal and political career has focused on encouraging
our treaty partner to see the future wisdom in their representatives advancing
nation-to-nation dispute resolution to resolve interpretative diferences in
implementing Treaty 3. My legal career has focused on the implementation
of Treaty 3 and understanding of how treaty councils and Indigenous law can
play a central role in nation-to-nation dispute resolution. My belief is that it
is in the process of becoming familiar with one another in formal diplomacy,
on a nation-to-nation basis, that we will understand the importance of both
interdependence and independence between the parties. Treaties, in my view,
allow parties to mutually agree to the boundaries of the relationship, and the
interdependencies in formal arrangements. Te substance of the treaty council
will be to properly work through interpretative difculties and prescribed dispute
resolution on this basis. Tis builds a friendship and common interests of working
through disputes and better defning a government-to-government relationship.
Given my knowledge of Treaty 3 claims, I am not surprised that Anishinaabeg
have brought their Treaty with the Queen to a domestic Canadian court. Is this a
modern form of “hunting” down the Queen? What are the “rules that govern us
4.

Leo Waisberg & Tim Holzkamm, “‘We Have One Mind and One Mouth. It Is the Decision
of All of Us’ Traditional Anishinaabe Governance of Treaty #3” (2001) Grand Council Treaty
#3 Working Paper at 6.
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rightly” in making treaty litigation acceptable to the Anishinaabe Nation of the
Boundary Waters, now self-proclaimed as the Anishinaabe Nation of Treaty 3?
To answer these questions, I will use my experience and understandings of Grand
Council protocols to explain how the original litigation was decided amongst us,
such that we were all “of one mind” prior to Statements of Claim being fnalized
on behalf of the Anishinaabe Nation. I do this in order to explain how a “once in
a lifetime” hunting down has been squandered and so that we are more prepared
if we need to use the extraordinary remedy of litigation ever again.
Te relationship between the parties has been more than adversarial; in fact,
it is an abusive and untrusting relationship with the Crown, a relationship in
need of an urgent prescription to bring it back to balance. Will the United Nations
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP)5 make a diference here?
Is there a better way of dispute resolution with legal and procedural remedies
against the Crown now that the Federal government has committed to the
implementation of the Declaration? In particular, Article 37 of UNDRIP declares:6
Indigenous peoples have the right to the recognition, observance and enforcement
of treaties, agreements and other constructive arrangements concluded with States
or their successors and to have States honour and respect such treaties, agreements
and other constructive agreements.
Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as diminishing or eliminating the
rights of indigenous peoples contained in treaties, agreements and other constructive
agreements.

“Recognition, observance and enforcement” of treaties is the impasse
that the Anishinaabe benefciaries of Treaty 3 fnd themselves in. Tere are no
domestic forums or mechanisms to establish a mutually agreeable process here.
Te specifc claims and self-government policies of the federal government are so
circumscribed by colonial perceptions of certainty, mutuality, and fnality that it
is not safe or advisable to enter these discussions from a historic reconciliation
perspective.7 Federal governments want to renegotiate terms to create a “modern
treaty” that establishes very clear powers and authorities between the parties in a
5.
6.
7.

United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, GA Res 295, UNGAOR, 61st
Sess, Supp No 49, UN Doc A/Res/61/295 [UNDRIP].
Ibid at Article 37.
Treaty knowledge keepers honour the historic reconciliation achieved in the solemnized
treaties, as the Creator and others have sanctioned these agreements in ceremony. Te
historic reconciliation in Treaty 3 is an understanding of what was agreed to, and that both
Anishinaabe Inakonigaawin (an Indigenous legal order) and the British common law rules
were applicable in ensuring that each party upheld their commitments and obligations
to one another.
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way that strips away the Indigenous law, protocols, and ceremonies that are core
to what the treaty relationship is.
Tis article involves my understanding of Treaty 3, a treaty made by my
nation, the Anishinaabe Nation of the Boundary Waters, represented by a Grand
Council,8 and the Queen, who represented her Nation. On the last day of treaty
negotiations, 3 October 1873, our principal spokesperson, Mawendopenais9
promised to “hunt” down the Treaty Commissioners personally, as representatives
of the Queen in England, if the treaty was breached. Tis was not an idle threat;
Mawendopenais was a formidable man, accustomed to dress in the traditional
way of an Ogichidaa, or boundary warrior of our nation. His face was likely
painted, and he stood much taller than most men. Tis Anishinaabe threat made
personally against Canada’s ofcials was dealt with quickly and diplomatically.
Treaty Commissioner and main spokesperson for the Crown, Lieutenant

8.

9.

A Grand Council is an institution of the Anishinaabeg, it is both spiritual and political and it
has the ceremonial and spiritual connections to bind the Nation together through protocol,
diplomacy and law. Tere are Midewewin leadership, both women and men, as well as the
political leadership and boundary warriors present to discuss matters of importance to the
Nation at the Grand Councils, many times in the past Grand Councils convened in both
Fall and Spring Assemblies. Grand Councils were ever present in the encounter era with
the French and English near Couchiching Falls on the Minnesota/Ontario border near Fort
Frances, Ontario. See e.g. Waisberg & Holzkamm, supra note 4.
Mawendopenais, I imagine the sketch at the beginning of this article was done after a reading
a reporter’s account of the Governor General’s visit of Rat Portage (near Kenora, ON) on
18 August 1881 that described the Anishinaabe Ogichidaa. See “Te Great Chief of the
Ojibways”, Te New York Times 3 September 1881:
Mawindobenesse, the great chief, is certainly one of the fnest-looking Indians I have ever
seen, and though he was carefully supported as he walked up from his canoe, it turned out
that all this apparent infrmity was merely put on to magnify his greatness in the eyes of
the distinguished visitors who eyes he supposed to be upon him, for as soon as the dancing
commenced he was one of the frst to engage in it, and he was quite as ready to keep it up as
were any of his subjects. though he has a grand pair of shoulders, straight and broad, without
the smallest inclination to stoop, a full chest, symmetrically tapered toward the waist, and
though, in short, Mawindobenesse has a remarkably fne fgure, it is his face that makes the
strongest impression in one’s memory. He has a broad, high forehead that recedes slightly and
regularly, almost or quite from the eyebrows. His eyes are decidedly good, though partially
thrown back by his prominent brows and cheek bones. His nose has just enough of the eagle’s
beak about it to escape being Grecian, his mouth has plenty of frmness and unmistakable
in expression while his lower jaw would indicate that he had all the physical courage, but
none of the brutality, of the successful prize-fghter. He looks like a man of superior courage,
intelligence, and character, and in looking at him it would be hard to divest one’s self of the
idea that he was not devoid of culture.
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Governor Alexander Morris made this key commitment, “Te Queen’s Ear is
promised to you.”10
Tese forgotten or ignored treaty claims are extraordinary, and the efort
to see the light of day in a courtroom is a testament to the resiliency of our
First Nation communities. Tere are so many barriers to litigation, including the
impecuniosity of the First Nations and the cost of litigation. It is no wonder that
we turn to the UNDRIP to aford us other forums for treaty dispute resolution.
In fact, I would argue for a specialized court co-developed between the parties,
including the important step that any treaty court would be given life by
Miinigoziiwin (Anishinaabe legal order) and Canada’s Constitution.11 It would
be truly an international court of a sui generis nature. Tis would be the better
forum, but procedural rules need to be co-developed between the parties in light
of the Declaration and the commitment to have justice and reciprocity between
the treaty partners in Canada.
A second Article in UNDRIP that is relevant to my argument is Article 27:
States shall establish and implement, in conjunction with indigenous peoples
concerned, a fair, independent, impartial, open and transparent process, giving
due recognition to [I]ndigenous peoples’ laws, traditions, customs and land tenure
systems, to recognize and adjudicate the rights of indigenous peoples, pertaining
to their lands, territories and resources, including those which were traditionally
owned or otherwise occupied or used. Indigenous peoples shall have the right to
participate in this process.

Tis institution does not exist in Canada. Canadian courts have become
an untrusted and biased forum for section 35 rights-holders, particularly, any
inherent or Indigenous legal right holder or authority. Te UNDRIP does have
some promising “reconciliation” ingredients, but only if those ingredients include
co-development with Indigenous peoples to create the fnal recipe and solution.

10. Keewatin v Minister of Natural Resources, 2011 ONSC 4801 at para 367 [“Keewatin 2011”].
“Te following are the terms of the treaty held at Northwest Angle the third day of October,
Eighteen Hundred and Seventy Tree”, Appendix A in Report on the Negotiations for Treaty 3
by Lieutenant Governor Alexander Morris, Ottawa, Library and Archives Canada (RG 10, vol
1918, fle 2790B, con C-11110). Te shorthand reporter’s notes observe: “Te Queen’s ear
would always be open to hear her Indian Subjects.”
11. Te Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms is Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 is, while section 35 is located in
Part II of Constitution Act, 1982. Te remedy for the breach of Section 35 may be found in
section 52, which reads: “Te Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and
any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent of the
inconsistency, of no force or efect.”
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With this article, I attempted to advance Anishinaabe custom on how to be
“of one mind” in using domestic courts to “hunt down” persons and governments
responsible for a breach of their sacred treaty obligations, hunting down being
the prerogative treaty remedy that the Anishinaabe kept for themselves.12 I also
argue that the common law is so ill-suited for treaty rights recognition, that
Crown intervention is procedurally necessary at the very beginning. Canada
should prioritize eforts with Indigenous partners to establish a path forward to
implement the Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s Call to Action 45,13 that
is the ultimate path to fxing treaty relationships. Until then, temporary solutions
like the recently announced Litigation Guidelines will be a controversial measure
inside of the Department of Justice, which may not receive full implementation
because of stronger beliefs in the adversarial system of litigation in Canada.
An example very connected to the Treaty 3 litigation discussed in this article is
guideline number 15 that states:14
Canada respects the right of Indigenous peoples and nations to defne themselves
and counsel’s pleadings and other submissions must respect the proper rightsbearing collective. Where rights and title have been asserted on behalf of larger
Indigenous entities—nations or linguistic groups, for example—and there are no
conficting interests, Canada in the proper case, or where supported by the available
evidence, will not object to the entitlement of those groups to bring the litigation.
Tis approach is consistent with principle 1, which afrms the Government of
Canada’s renewed nation-to-nation approach. In Aboriginal rights and title cases,
Canada will not usually plead that smaller Indigenous entities—clans or extended
family groups, for example—are the proper holders of Aboriginal rights and title.

12. Given the information that the Anishinaabe had about the Robinson Superior treaty and the
Minnesota treaties and “slow” or non-implementation of treaty obligations, Mawendopenais,
speaking for the people advanced what I term a prerogative power of “hunting down” treaty
breakers. As the sovereign power over the given territory at the time of treaty-making it
was important for Mawendopenais to explain that there would be personal consequences
for breaking Anishinaabe Inakonigaawin, or the creator’s rule, whichever was the case. Tis
was not an illegitimate remedy, I would argue, as Ogichidaa are boundary warriors and
responsible for keeping the peace.
13. See e.g. Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, Truth and Reconciliation
Commission: Calls to Action (Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, 2015) at 4.
Section IV of Call to Action 45 reads: “Reconcile Aboriginal and Crown constitutional and
legal orders to ensure that Aboriginal peoples are full partners in Confederation, including
the recognition and integration of Indigenous laws and legal traditions in negotiation and
implementation processes involving Treaties, land claims, and other constructive agreements.”
14. Canada, Department of Justice, Te Attorney General’s Directive on Civil Litigation Involving
Indigenous Peoples, 2018, online: <www.justice.gc.ca/eng/csj-sjc/ijr-dja/dclip-dlcpa/
litigation-litiges.html>.
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I attempted to explain through example, how treaty litigation has created
even deeper relations of animosity with the Crown and may feed violence if
the treaty relationship is damaged beyond repair. It is unlikely that the above
Litigation Guidelines will continue to exist after the next federal election, but they
provide a temporary solution and promise of dealing with an issue outlined in the
litigation discussed in this article.
So what to do with the breach of a procedural treaty right and the forgetting of
this important diplomatic relationship? I realize that to most legal academics and
lawyers, who want to advance treaty litigation, my approach seems questionable;
why fght for a remedy that is normative when you can get a strong legal ruling
through rights recognition in section 35 of Constitution Act, 1982?15
Tere are several retellings of Treaty 3, as it is my understanding that the
Anishinaabe treaty protocol is to remember treaties through oral understandings
of the treaty. It is the role of the “recorder” or, a person having extraordinary
memory to ofcially retell the version of the treaty to the Grand Council.
In Canada, there was not a similar oral tradition, and like the Robinson Treaties
before it, a “quit claim” deed called “Articles of a Treaty” was drafted to memorialize
Treaty 3 prior to 3 October 1873. Both Simon Dawson and Alexander Morris
took their own personal notes of their discussions with the Anishinaabe, as may
have been European tradition, or their independent responsibility as appointed
Treaty Commissioners. Simon Dawson’s notes are more culturally acceptable to
Anishinaabe readers and historians, likely because of his long experience working
with the Anishinaabe of the boundary waters region.16
Te Grand Council Treaty 3 was revitalized in various periods of treaty
relationships with Canada. Te Grand Council was ever-present in early European
relationships since the seventeenth century. Te main spokesperson was called “La
Premier” in early fur-trading accounts and also Niitum or “frst among equals”
as the Grand Chief of the Nation.17 Tere is an unpublished account of this early
history completed by Treaty and Aboriginal Rights Research (TARR) historians,
Leo Waisberg and Tim Holzkamm, called “We Have One Mind and One Mouth.
It is the Decision of All of Us” Traditional Anishinaabe Governance of Treaty
#3” that shares several of these early contact reports with the Grand Chief and
15. Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 9, s 35.
16. See e.g. Alexander Morris, Te Treaties of Canada with the Indians of Manitoba and the
North-West Territories, Including the Negotiations on Which Tey Were Based, and Other
Information Relating Tereto (Bedfords, Clarke, 1880) at 72 [Morris, Treaties] (“Te ear of the
Queen’s Government will always be open to hear the complaints of her Indian people, and
she will deal with her servants that do not do their duty in a proper manner.”).
17. Waisberg & Holzkamm, supra note 4 at 6.
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the Grand Council. Also, one of the most important documents created by the
Grand Council Treaty 3 is this “We have kept our part of the Treaty document”
that can still be viewed online at the Grand Council Treaty 3 website, this is a
list of the treaty-based grievances in 1990. Tis document is an overview of the
various land-based treaty grievances of the Grand Council. However, rather than
being granted the Queen’s ear to listen to these well-documented grievances, the
First Nations themselves were told that they would need to remedy their claims
through the specifc claims policy of Indian Afairs in 1976.

I. REFLECTING ON WHAT MADE TREATY 3 A
RECONCILIATION WORTH NATIONAL COMMEMORATION
Te shorthand reporter’s note is my favourite retelling of the promise of procedural
justice for the Anishinaabe. It is more in line with Anishinaabe Inakonigaawin,
the “law and order” of my Nation, based on the fact that the Queen must listen to
the Anishinaabe in the future—as part of their treaty relationship. It is a promise
fashioned to illicit inter-cultural understanding, as the Anishinaabe did not speak
English, nor, did they understand the Canadian legal or political order. Tey
were told that, the Queen would listen to you if you had grievances, implying
in the British constitutional tradition of the time, that the Queen had certain
powers and a special role and that she would personally be responsible to fx or
remedy the problem.
In the meantime, in the decade after Treaty 3 was made, Mawendopenais
was doing his part to enforce the treaty. For example, he was actively advocating
against being forced to build a school-house on-reserve prior to receiving a school
teacher in his community. He demanded to be shown in Canada’s “Articles
of a Treaty” where it said that that schoolhouses were a pre-condition to the
“education” guarantee in Treaty 3.18 Other grievances would be heard by Canada’s
ofcials (including Alexander Morris and Simon Dawson, who was a Member of
Parliament for the District of Algoma) from delegations of Chiefs who went

18. “We Have Kept our Part of the Treaty” Anishinaabe Understanding of Treaty #3 (Grand
Council Treaty #3, October 2011) at 44.
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to Winnipeg and Tunder Bay to make good on their promise to enforce the
treaty themselves.19
In this article, I argue that the right for the Anishinaabe was to take up a
process that would efectively “hunt down” or prosecute a treaty breaker. Te
focus would have been on the men who negotiated the treaty, Alexander Morris,
Simon Dawson, and Joseph Provencher. Alexander Morris was subject to various
delegations from the Anishinaabe in the period after the treaty was made.20
However, colonialism would weaken the resolve of the Anishinaabe Nation,
as the Grand Council had to meet secretly. Tere were early twentieth century
newspaper accounts of panicked Euro-Canadian neighbours, as the military was
ordered in when the Anishinaabe left the reserve for ceremonies.21 Further, the
Indian Act was over-policing their original civil society, ceremonies and languages,
which could not be practiced after the 1890s. Notably, lawyers could not even
work for Indian Act bands until after changes to the Indian Act in 1951.

II. TREATY COUNCILS AS DISPUTE RESOLUTION
So it is not surprising that Mawendopenais would attend with some pomp and
circumstance, to meet the Governor General in Canada in 1881. Te Queen’s
foremost representative stopping to meet with the Anishinaabe, less than eight
years after a treaty would be a very special event. Tere is not much of a record
beyond the newspaper account of Mawendopenais, and not any mention of a
specifc meeting or discussion between the two nations in the fall of that year. What
would have happened if there was a true government to government meeting?
Would the Governor General have explained the plans to impose Indian Act
and Indian Act governance on the Anishinaabeg who still had hereditary Chiefs
and traditional governance? Would they have carefully explained that children
would soon be forcibly removed from families to go to Christian schools between
1900 and 1902 in both Fort Frances and Kenora, Ontario? Tese would all be
an impossible discussion in a true treaty relationship. Te discussions would be
especially difcult with this relatively strong Anishinaabe Nation, who had kept
Christian Missionaries away from their communities for a century and jealously
19. I have reviewed Canada’s archive materials on treaty grievances for my LLM thesis. See
Sara J Mainville, Manidoo Mazina’igan: An Anishinaabe Perspective of Treaty 3 (LLM Tesis,
University of Toronto, 2007) [unpublished] [Mainville, Manidoo]. See also Brian Walmark,
Alexander Morris and the Saulteaux: Te Context and Making of Treaty Tree, 1869–73 (MA
Tesis, Lakehead University, 1993) [unpublished] at 31.
20. Mainville, Manidoo, supra note 19.
21. Mainville, “Treaty Councils,” supra note 1.
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guarded their Midewewin (a centuries old organized, spiritual society). Of course,
it is unlikely that these discussions were had. A ceremonial leader like Governor
General Sir John Douglas Campbell (who was on an expedition of promoting
western farming in Canada),22 was unlikely to want to alarm Mawendopenais
and his men. Te usurping power of colonialism is an ongoing narrative that
delays and aggravates the treaty relationship. It has no transparency and colonial
forces do not seek consent from peoples who they believe are of inferior race or
religious customs.
Justice for treaty rights holders was the remedial promise of section 35 of
the Constitution Act, 1982, a reconciliatory process to further insure peaceful
relations between the parties despite a long history of animosity as opposed to
friendship. Tis “remedy” was also promised in the specifc claims process to
treaty rights holders, post Calder v Attorney-General of British Columbia 23 after
the federal government formally established a native claims policy in 1974. Te
Grand Council Treaty 3 is proud to be of the opinion that they established the
frst “Treaty and Aboriginal Rights Research” ofce in the country.24 However,
there is a history of Treaty 3 claims being stopped and restarted because of the
lack of resources and capacity of communities to carry these expensive and
complicated processes forward.
Tere is important history of treaty-making involving who negotiated the
treaty on behalf of the Anishinaabe, the Ogichidaa spokespeople including
Powassin and Mawendopenais were tested warriors and were high ranking
Mitewewin (medicine society) members. Te word “obstinate” was used by
Justice Sanderson in her lengthy review of the making of treaty 3, and the Chiefs

22. Te Canadian West, “Governor General’s Party Crossing Lake of the Woods 1881,
by Sydney Prior Hall” (31 August 2001), online: <www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/
canadian-west/052920/05292014_e.html>.
23. See Calder v Attorney-General of British Columbia, [1973] SCR 313 at 328 [Calder]. Calder
established claims for Aboriginal title and rights within the Supreme Court of Canada’s
recognition that:
the fact is that when the settlers came, the Indians were there, organized in societies and
occupying the land as their forefathers had done for centuries. Tis is what Indian title means
and it does not help one in the solution of this problem to call it a “personal or usufructuary
right”. What they are asserting in this action is that they had a right to continue to live on their
lands as their forefathers had lived and that this right has never been lawfully extinguished.
Tere can be no question that this right was “dependent on the goodwill of the Sovereign.”

24. My friend and former co-worker, Andy Sky says that the TARR unit was established
well before 1976.
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lack of true desire to make a Treaty with Canada in the Keewatin v Ontario.25
In fact, Elder Allan White26 had told me on more than one occasion, that the
Anishinaabe Nation had sent scouts to Montreal to see if we, the Anishinaabeg,
could win a war with the British. Unfortunately (or fortunately), the report back
was that the best course for us was to make a treaty with the British based on what
was viewed in Montreal as the British military power. I can only imagine the
Grand Council meeting where this report back was made and the careful strategy
that was created to broker a treaty with the Queen.
Another important development was that the Anishinaabe had hired literate
French–Anishinaabemowin interpreters, who wrote down the terms agreed to,
in a French document. Tese terms, also known as the Nolin Notes, expand
on the other written records, as does Simon Dawson’s notes, a “short-hand
reporter’s” notes made during the discussions, and a newspaper account of the
treaty council of 1873, found in “Te Manitoban” newspaper.27 Tese many
varied contemporaneously created records of what was agreed to in the four-day
Treaty Council, should illustrate how easily the problem of hearing simultaneous
interpretations and translations could vary the meaning of what was said, what
was asked and ofered, and what was mutually agreed to. Tis problem deepens
when you understand the vast inter-cultural diferences that existed between the
British and the Anishinaabeg in 1873.
Te Anishinaabe near Rainy Lake and Lake of the Woods had established
an agreement, that would likely be considered a treaty, for the so-called Dawson
route, the canoe and road route completed in 1870 for military and other British
expeditions to cross our territory, before 1860, and that treaty was breached early
on. Te three-dollar annuity agreed to with Simon Dawson, along with various
identifed breaches, such as the taking of timber for steam-boats, were grievances
discussed at length at the beginning of the 1873 treaty council.28 Tis former
25. Keewatin 2011, supra note 10 at para 51.
26. Elder Allan White is a citizen of Naotkamegwanning First Nation otherwise known as
Whitefsh Bay. He grew up with oral tradition of our people surrounding him, his father
was the last Anishinaabe judge that he could remember. Te practices of Anishinaabe
judges is another tradition in our Nation that I am discovering and learning about. See e.g.
Aimée Craft, “Anishinaabe Nibi Inaakonigewin Report: Refecting the Water Laws Research
Gathering conducted with Anishinaabe Elders” (2014) at 4, 15, online: <create-h2o.ca/
pages/annual_conference/presentations/2014/ANI_Gathering_Report_-_June24.pdf>.
27. For an extensive review of “the documents” of Treaty 3 see, Keewatin, 2011, supra note 10
at para 308-88.
28. See Morris, Treaties, supra note 16 at 55. Morris writes: “Promises had many times been
made to them, and, said the speaker, unless they were now fulflled they would not consider
the broader question of the treaty.”
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breach of terms would have informed the Anishinaabe Chiefs, through very
contemporary experience, that an efective procedural remedy would be required
for any new treaty with the Queen and her men.
Clearly, it had been a long time since the “Queen’s government ear” was
available to the Anishinaabe. My record is that sometime between the trial and
the fnal appeal in St Catherine’s Milling and Lumber, which ended in 1888,29 the
treaty councils had stopped. Te fnal ruling resulted in an aggressive provincial
hand in changing treaty arrangements, including the extinguishment of reserves
along the fertile Rainy River watershed and the Quetico Provincial Park.30 At the
same time, the building of navigational and hydro dams led to Winnipeg-basin
fooding all along the Lake of the Woods, English River, and Rainy Lake
watersheds. By this time, the Crown was aware that the relationship with the
Anishinaabe was breached, almost beyond repair. Te dust had not settled on
all of the unilateral changes made between Ontario and Canada (in various
boundary disputes and litigation) until the fnal negotiations achieved provincial
approval of the Treaty 3 reserves in 1915. But, by that time, the Spanish fu and
poverty had decimated the population of the boundary waters Anishinaabe, not
to mention the destruction and havoc that Indian Residential Schools were to
cause upon our communities into the next century.

III. INTERNAL RULES ESTABLISHED BY THE GRAND
COUNCIL TO PROTECT THE TREATY
From the 1980s to the 1990s, the Treaty and Aboriginal Rights Research (TARR)
unit worked with two Canadian lawyers who have stayed connected to the Grand
Council through their work into the new millennium to forward various claims
related to fooding throughout the territory. Tese lawyers have held long-term
relationships with the First Nations and understanding of the original claim
coordinating role of the Grand Council. Tere was a formal protocol developed
during the TARR unit’s initial research years, and that was agreed to through the
29. St Catherine’s Milling and Lumber v Te Queen (1888), LR 14 AC 46 (PC).
30. Rainy River First Nations’ land claim was settled in 2003 related to the loss of reserve
lands along the Rainy River and the Sturgeon Lake Band claim (Quetico Park lands) is still
underway after years of negotiations. For an account of the Ontario/Canada negotiations to
fnalize Treaty 3 reserves and extinguish the Sturgeon Lake reserve, see Wayne E Daugherty,
“Treaty Research Report – Treaty Tree [1873]: Treaties and Historical Research Centre,
Self-Government”, (Indian and Northern Afairs Canada, Ottawa 1986), online: <www.
rcaanc-cirnac.gc.ca/DAM/DAM-CIRNAC-RCAANC/DAM-TAG/STAGING/texte-text/
tre3_1100100028672_eng.pdf>.
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Grand Council Treaty 3. Te centralized TARR unit and the two historians, Leo
Waisberg and Tim Holzkamm had established the claim documents as advised
by the various community-hired lawyers. Because of these central research
eforts, it was acknowledged that the team knew who had the strongest claims for
purposes of litigation.
If a community was forced to bring the treaty to court, the protocol held
that the plaintif, or defendant (if it was a treaty right defence), would need to
be sanctioned by the Grand Council Treaty 3, through the “Chiefs in Assembly.”
Moreover, other communities would consider supporting the claim through small
monetary contributions if they could aford to help with the fundraising efort.
Tis was before 1990. At this time, there were fled claims around the subject
matter of the “headlands guarantee,” wild rice, fsheries, timber claims, and most
First Nations had advanced their reserve claims for treaty land entitlement and
fooding damages.31

IV. THE TREATY 3 LITIGATION WAR CHEST
In addition to litigation, First Nations and the Grand Council asserted demands
for consultation and resource revenue-sharing in Treaty 3 territory to protect
their inherent authority, and their vision of the treaty relationship once Section
35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 was in place. In 1994, an agreement was reached
with Bell Canada that allowed their secondary fbre-optic corridor through the
southern portion of the territory including six First Nation reserves. During that
process, Bell Canada also funded the Grand Council in their eforts to create a
written law called Manito Aki Inakonigaawin, the Great Earth Law. Tis law
was written down because it applied to industry and “authorized” development
was now a requirement under Treaty 3. Of course, writing down the law was not
creating the law, it was a law that had existed in Anishinaabemowin for a very
31. David T McNab, “Te Administration of Treaty #3: Te Location of the Boundaries of
Treaty #3 Indian Reserves in Ontario”, in Ian Getty & Antoine Lussier, eds, As Long As
Te Sun Shines and Water Flows (UBC Press, 1983) 148 at 148: “By extending the existing
shoreline boundaries to a line, drawn from headland to headland, the Indian reserves
would be greatly increased in size and the Indian bands would have exclusive control of the
fshery and wild rice in that [bay] area.” Te 1894 agreement and it’s headlands guarantee
disappeared in future implementation of the treaty discussions between Ontario, Canada,
and the Anishinaabe in the twentieth century. “Headlands” claims have been established by
Treaty 3 communities and brought before the Province of Ontario in the Grand Council
Treaty #3’s political “table” discussions with the Ministry of Indigenous Relationships and
Reconciliation that I was aware of when I was Chief of Couchiching First Nation in 2014.
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long time. It was the “process” that was written down to give some certainty
to industry that there was a clear path to receive an authorization from the
Anishinaabe Nation in Treaty 3.
Bell Canada wanted access to the six independent reserves in order to support
its fbre-optic network, but it agreed to a revenue sharing agreement that was
formulated based on the Treaty 3 territory as a whole. Approximately 150,000
dollars was received every year into the “Bell FOTS3 fund” by Grand Council
Treaty 3. Tere was a misunderstanding about who was the “benefciary” of the
fund created by the Bell Canada payments over those twenty years from 1994
to 2014. Te six First Nations clarifed at the very end of the agreement, during
renewal talks, that Bell Canada made the payments in order to have access to
their six reserves only. Eventually, those First Nations accessed the funds in the
Grand Council Treaty 3 bank account and depleted it between 2015 and 2016.
Prior to this, it was considered the Anishinaabe Nation in Treaty 3’s litigation
war chest. As a result, the Grand Council had withdrawn signifcant monies for
litigation from the war chest between 2012 and 2015.
Te Great Earth Law did not fuel a large war chest for treaty litigation
beyond the Bell Canada funding. Given the uncertainties around process and
spending the monies, the fund was invested well and grew from 1994 to 2008.
When I worked for the Grand Chief, we often felded discussions about access to
the monies for a variety of reasons of signifcant importance to the communities.
As lawyers, the Grand Chief and I often discussed legal strategy around the Grand
Council meetings, and there was an expectation that some type of litigation
would come before the Grand Council.
Earlier in 2000, the people at the Grand Council Treaty 3 signed the
Millennium Declaration to ensure that their Assemblies would be more
transparent, especially for important decisions of the Nation. Tis Declaration
required that during the spring and fall assemblies, the Nation would convene as
a National Assembly for the frst two days of the Assembly, and the fnal third day
would be for the Chiefs in Assembly to make decisions to implement the Nation’s
will. Tis was an attempt to decolonize the Grand Council Treaty 3 which was
criticized for being too connected to the Indian Act authority of the Chief and
Councils. Te Assemblies have been operating in this way ever since.
Te Millennium Declaration has been the goal that I hold most Grand Council
Treaty 3 decisions against, that we try to make decisions as a Nation in Assembly.
Unfortunately, it is more often than not that we fail to meet this standard in our
most important deliberations. Decisions at the National Assembly were thought
to be more inclusive of the Nation and involved better decision-making. We tried

114

(2020) 57 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

to revitalize the famous Mawendopenais closing speech (for Treaty 3, 3 October
1873) of doing our business “openly and in the light of day” so that our decisions
would be inclusive and fnal, as Mawendopenais had explained, there should be
“no grumbling” by the Anishinaabe after the treaty was made. However, the “no
grumbling” only works if the participants feel strong enough and empowered
enough to voice their important concerns and objections. Te concerns about the
litigation strategy were voiced by the First Nations’ legal counsel at meetings of
legal counsel and it became clear that we were not truly “all of one mind” about
the litigation agenda that we approved.

V. STOPPING CLEARCUTTING IN THE KEEWATIN LANDS
All of these developments to “open the war chest” would have been greatly
disappointing to the community of Grassy Narrows First Nation, as they were
independently litigating a treaty-based judicial review up to 2005, when the
Ontario Superior Court decided that the litigation must take form of a more
expensive action and trial. Tis was much more expensive for the community
who was wrestling with a number of issues, including mercury poisoning within
its community after decades of negligence by the provincial Ministry of the
Environment. Grassy Narrow’s Trapping Council had asked to bring the treaty
to court and they had also asked to access the war chest for its litigation. While
Grassy Narrows were granted approval and support for the judicial review,
no fnancial support was forthcoming. Te war chest was still inaccessible at
this time. Grassy Narrows was forced to bring an advanced cost motion into
the litigation now that it was a full trial, which arguably limited their ability to
fully litigate the substantive issues in the best way possible.32 Te Grassy Narrows
“impecuniosity” was relied on for the advanced costs motion, but also made it
challenging to coordinate legal strategy with friendly parties.

32. See Keewatin v Ontario (Minister Of Natural Resources) (2006), 32 CPC (6th) 258 (ONSC)
at paras 7-8 [Keewatin, 2006].
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Te cost and coordination of a large treaty claim is probably best illustrated
in the Grassy Narrows litigation.33 Once the trial of this matter began, there
were procedural motions before it, which seems to always be the case in section
35 disputes with the Crown. One motion was about “who” were the proper
representatives of the Grassy Narrows claim. Tis claim was frst established by
the Grassy Narrows Trapper’s Council, namely Willie and Andrew Keewatin and
Joseph William Fobister. It was these members who brought the litigation to
the Grand Council for their approval, to bring the treaty to court. Chief Simon
Fobister was also a supporter of this litigation and he attended court with the
plaintifs. Chief Fobister was the Deputy Grand Chief of Grand Council Treaty
3 and he was very aware of Grand Council Treaty 3 protocol and what was
happening on their agenda.
Te Crown argued that it would be necessary to name Grassy Narrows First
Nation formally as part of the representative action “jointly and severally liable”
for any costs award if the potential of costs awards for court procedure was granted
against the plaintifs. Obviously, this had a chilling efect of anyone joining this
trial prematurely. Te Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources (MNR) argued that
the plaintifs, if not the band council, could be less disciplined because the Indian
Act protected their personal assets from seizure. Te Band Council would not be
as immune from such actions. Te court decided that it was premature to name
Grassy Narrows as a plaintif, or to make the band jointly and severally liable.34
Te court in that decision also laid out in some detail the cost added to the
plaintif, now that the court procedure was a more expensive trial/action, rather
than the planned judicial review, at the Superior Court of Ontario:35
Te costs of litigating this case for the plaintifs are estimated at just over $2.8
million. Tis fgure is based on a detailed budget for an estimated 12-week trial
on all issues and it provides for use of experts (scientifc, historical, archival, and
anthropological).

33. See Keewatin v Ontario (Ministry of Natural Resources) (2003), 66 OR (3d) 370 (Ont Div
Ct). Tis case started as a judicial review, but Abitibi-Consolidated and Ontario won a
motion to quash the judicial review, forcing the plaintifs to spend the next two to three years
organizing the case as a more expensive action in Court with a fuller hearing and evidentiary
record. I was an articling student in 2005 at Sierra Legal Defence Fund (“SLDF”, which is
now Ecojustice) where one of my frst duties was to send many of the judicial review fles to
the BC law frm that would now fully represent Grassy Narrows in the new trial. SLDF was
supporting the judicial review of Grassy Narrows. Grassy Narrows quickly looked to the law
of advanced costs to advocate for cost-sharing between the parties.
34. See Keewatin, 2006, supra note 32 at para 6.
35. Ibid at paras 71-73.
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Most of the work by counsel for Grassy Narrows has gone unpaid, and most of what
has been collected has been paid not by Grassy Narrows, but Sierra Legal Defence
Fund.
Grassy Narrows paid Cook Roberts LLP a bill of $18,391.54 in December 2005.
Grassy Narrows obtained this money by making a special request to INAC for the
Band’s Ottawa trust fund monies.

In addition to the cost of the trial were the costs of the appeal to the Court
of Appeal for Ontario and to the Supreme Court of Canada. Costs were awarded
on a partial indemnity basis in advance by the courts involved.36 Tis would
also later include the party of the Wabauskang First Nation, who was added as
a party in the Court of Appeal for Ontario and the Supreme Court of Canada.
Grassy Narrows, Wabauskang, and Lac Seul were together, one Anishinaabe
community around 1873.
Te proper rights-holder in the Grassy Narrows decision was worked out
by the legal team representing the most interested communities who were
neighbouring the claimant. However, my experience as an advisor to the
Ogichidaakwe (Grand Chief ) in Grand Council Treaty 3 as the trial went on and
during the application deadlines on appeal for interventions, was that there were
strong concerns about the treaty representation and fairness for the outstanding
land claims. At the time, there was a concern about the “reserve creation” issue as
it was being discussed in specifc claims, fooding negotiations by several teams
across the territory on behalf of more than fourteen First Nation communities in
Treaty 3. Te Treaty 3 issue of when reserves were created, included arguments
that reserves were created after survey and counter-arguments that involve
the Ontario-Canada negotiations where Ontario held back Ontario’s consent
to 1915 for the reserves. Ontario’s consent would seem to be a requirement
in Canadian law after the Weywaykum decision in 2002. Tis would greatly
diminish “damages” for food claim settlements if the issue was commented on
prior to being properly in front of the of a decision-maker.37 Te Grassy Narrows
trial was all about the evidence related to the negotiations and settlements around
36. Grassy Narrows, supra note 2 at para 55, Keewatin v Ontario (Natural Resources), 2013 ONCA
158 at para 235.
37. See Wewaykum Indian Band v Canada, 2002 SCC 79 at para 15. Wewaykum stated that:
Federal-provincial cooperation was required in the reserve-creation process because, while
the federal government had jurisdiction over “Indians, and Lands reserved for the Indians”
under s. 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867, Crown lands in British Columbia, on which
any reserve would have to be established, were retained as provincial property. Any unilateral
attempt by the federal government to establish a reserve on the public lands of the province
would be invalid…
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Ontario boundaries that included the fnalization of reserve creation for Treaty
3. Several Treaty 3 communities intervened in the two appeals. Tis created
additional delay and expense for Grassy Narrows, who were being funded on a
partial indemnity basis.
Most litigators will explain how complex treaty litigation is generally,
and how much more complex Treaty 3 litigation is because of the division of
powers and boundaries issues being settled between the Crown governments
after Confederation. Tis complexity is best illustrated by reviewing the
Grassy Narrows trial decision that is 1663 paragraphs long.38 Not included in
that legal history is the work that the Indian Act administration has done to
usurp governing authority from the Grand Council of the Boundary Waters
Anishinaabe, including the Anishinaabe law and social structures that bound us
together as one Nation.

VI. GRAND COUNCIL AND THE WAR CHEST LITIGATION
In 2011, I was asked by the Grand Chief to coordinate the development of rules
to access the Bell Canada Funding (the war chest). Te resulting Consolidated
Revenue Trust Fund (CRTF) rules were adopted in 2011 by the Grand Council
Treaty 3. Again, the only dollars in the CRTF were the Bell Canada dollars and
interest earned from investing those dollars, but it was a substantial war chest for
litigation. Te frst litigation matter to access the fund had to be proposed in the
National Assembly, be supported, and then voted on with more information,
including a litigation budget, at a later Chiefs Assembly so that the amounts
accessed would be certain and limited. A process was established and three pieces
of litigation quickly went through: (1) Te Grand Council Treaty 3 intervention
at the Court of Appeal for Ontario for the Grassy Narrows trial decision; (2)
Te new Treaty Right to Education litigation; and (3) A judicial review of the
decision that allowed the sale of dams owned by Abitibi Consolidated to H2O
Power, as those dams had illegally fooded Treaty 3 reserves for over a century and
was continuing to food the reserves without any form of easement.39
I was in the room for these decisions and there was feeling of history being
made for the “treaty right to education” litigation. Unfortunately, the strategy to

38. See Keewatin 2011, supra note 10.
39. See Kelly v Canada (AG), 2013 ONSC 1220 [Kelly 2013], Ogichidaakwe v Ontario (Energy),
2014 ONSC 5492 [Ogichidaakwe], Keewatin v Ontario (Natural Resources), 2013 ONCA
158 [Keewatin 2013].
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hunt down the treaty breakers was not transparent enough for the Nation and
some dissent was sown within communities.
Te Treaty 3 education litigation was the most divisive. As oral tradition
people, the expectation is that all the impacted people would be in the room when
a decision is made. With a claim this large, involving everyone as an education
benefciary, many people felt left out of the decision-making process. Also, legal
counsel for many First Nations examined the “Statement of Claim” document
and had difering opinions on how the case was pleaded. Tese diferences of
opinion were so key because unanimity was needed to proceed with this claim
in court. As an insider, I was aware that the Statement of Claim was created as a
strategy to bring Canada to the negotiation table. We had begun to collect data
to show the gap in funding between our schools and mainstream schools, and we
had begun a process of defning where we wanted our treaty right to education
to take our communities, including culture and language curriculum and other
key investments. Not everyone was able to put all of these pieces together and
after about six months, there was open dissent about this litigation by some of
the Chiefs. Tis was especially surprising to me, as this education claim was so
celebrated when it was frst approved.
Tere was less time spent on the intervention at the Court of Appeal for
Ontario by the Grand Council Treaty 3 in the Grassy Narrows case, but it was the
most successful of the three matters in litigation funded by the Treaty 3 war chest.
I was personally very happy to read parts of the Court of Appeal for Ontario
decision about Treaty 3:40
Te principle of constitutional evolution has an important bearing upon treaties
with First Nations. Treaties are solemn agreements and they are intended to last
indefnitely. Te rights they guarantee are not frozen in time…Treaties must be
capable of adapting to the natural evolution of the Constitution, which evolves
as a “living tree” to meet “the changing political and cultural realities of Canadian
society.”
As the English Court of Appeal explained in R. v. Secretary of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Afairs, ex parte Indian Association of Alberta, in relation to a challenge
to proposals for constitutional change in 1982, if treaties are to be honoured by the
Crown “so long as the sun rises and river fows,” treaty interpretation has to evolve
along with the Constitution…

Unfortunately, the Court of Appeal for Ontario understanding of the treaty
as the Articles of a Treaty is underscored by reprinting those Articles at the end
of their decision. Despite this, a step forward is made now that the Crown is
40. Keewatin 2013, supra note 39 at paras 137-38.
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understood as both the provincial and federal governments, which is the opposite
of what the plaintif, Grassy Narrows was arguing. Te provincial government is a
necessary party to Treaty 3 because they hold a lot of the important constitutional
authority with regard to treaty relationships. Now, with this signifcant change
in the treaty dynamic, would there be no better reason at that time to have a
treaty council? Unfortunately, no. Te Grassy Narrows decision of the Court of
Appeal for Ontario was appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada and all the
intervening parties went forward with their interventions including the Grand
Council Treaty 3.41
At the same time, a judicial review about the sale of Abitibi-Consolidated’s
hydroelectric dams to H2O Power Ltd. was also controversial.42 Tis judicial
review was spurred on by lawyers for several claims related to fooding. Tat
group of lawyers informally created the theory of the case for the judicial review.
A law frm was hired that had no relationship with the food claim lawyers and
that may have been detrimental to the success of the judicial review. Te fact
that the legal team was fairly brand new to the Grand Council Treaty 3 was also
an expensive problem. Te more interesting story for this article about treaty
remedies and rights-claimants is how the judicial review and the trial on the
treaty right to education had met a similar end in litigation, on the question of
who was the proper representative.
In Kelly v Canada (Attorney General),43 the Superior Court of Ontario agreed
with Canada that the treaty claim against Canada was improperly pleaded in two
ways: the plaintif was not the twenty-eight bands or a “proper representative”
of those twenty-eight bands and the claim itself was non-justiciable, as it was a
dispute on education policy of Canada, and the plaintif’s lawyer admitted that
it was a strategy to get Canada to the negotiation table. However, upon appeal
to the Court of Appeal for Ontario, the claim was found to be justiciable and
the Court agreed that the defect about proper representative of the twenty-eight
bands could be fxed. Te Court decided that “Band Council Resolutions”

41. Supra note 2.
42. Ogichidaakwe, supra note 41.
43. Kelly 2013, supra note 39 at paras 121, 156.
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would establish that the named plaintifs were the proper representatives of those
twenty-eight First Nations for the treaty right to education claim.44
In Ogichidaakwe v Ontario (Energy),45 the Ministry of Energy and the Ontario
Power Authority utilized the “Kelly order” to question the proper representative
of the judicial review for the Treaty 3 claimants against the decision to allow the
sale of the hydro dams. Te lawyers for the Grand Council Treaty 3 submitted to
Justice Perrell that his original order in the education litigation was ofensive as
it went against Anishinaabe custom. Justice Perrell shared that he understood the
legal argument against the “Kelly order:”46
Te Anishinaabe Nation is a community, and it is understandable that the Applicants
would be discomfted and resistant to being ordered to sue other members of their
community. And it is understandable, therefore, that the Applicants might view
a Kelly v. Canada Order as ofensive to Aboriginal custom. And it would also be
understandable that the more cynical and suspicious of the Applicants might
harbour the unexpressed sentiment that a Kelly v. Canada Order could be used as a
divide-and-conquer tactic in civil litigation against Aboriginal peoples.

Notwithstanding the sympathy that the judge had for this argument, he felt
that the order was necessary under the circumstances:47
If, however, the Indian Bands do not agree with the Applicants’ assertion that they
are the rights holder, then they necessarily should be joined as party respondents,
precisely because they may be correct in their own assessment that they are rights
holders and they should participate in the judicial review proceeding. Here, it bears
44. See Kelly v Canada (AG), 2014 ONCA 92. Te case states:
Tis is a fundamentally diferent challenge from that faced by the appellants before the motion
judge. Moreover, as we have said, on this appeal hearing the Crown declined to specifcally
identify those parts of the appellants’ pleading that allegedly run afoul of the requirement
of justiciability. While the Crown, of course, is free to reconsider its position on the
appellants’ proposed action, as currently framed, the altered basis for the Crown’s opposition
to the appellants’ action as now advanced by the Crown results in evident unfairness to the
appellants. Te appellants are entitled to know the case they have to meet on a pleadings
challenge to their action…

Accordingly, the appellants are granted leave to continue this proceeding as a representative
action on behalf of themselves and all persons who are benefciaries of Treaty 3, and Grand
Chief Warren White (who, as discussed below, replaces Grand Chief Diane Kelly) is
appointed as the representative plaintif in the action, provided that (1) they are authorized
to do so by band council resolutions of all 28 reserve bands, or (2) they join as party
defendants those bands that do not authorize the representative action (ibid at paras 8, 21).
45. Ogichidaakwe 2014, supra note 41.
46. Ibid at para 9.
47. Ibid at para 38.
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repeating that if all the putative Aboriginal rights holders are before the court, it
becomes unnecessary to determine which of them is the genuine rights holder.
Te adamancy of the Applicants’ assertion, therefore, undermines the Applicants’
assertion that it is beyond doubt that they are the rights holder, which I repeat they
may well be, but that judicially remains to be seen.

Te end result of the two judicial matters was that the plaintif/applicants
were unable to bring twenty eight Band Council Resolutions to the court to
evidence the proper representation in those cases. Additionally, the judicial
review went well-beyond the budget received from the Grand Council Treaty
3 for the preliminary matters and motions. Both matters received a fnite
budget from the CRTF—under $300,000 for the judicial review and just over
$1,000,000 for the education litigation. Te judicial review procedures had cost
over $900,000. It was my initial belief that the over-spending on the part of the
judicial review may have been the over-arching concern of the First Nations and
may have been why the Band Council Resolutions were not forthcoming. Years
later, I now understand that there were several process problems—we did not
follow our original rules, so that created some mistrust and misunderstanding
of these claims.
Te irony of courts establishing other rules, including that the “proper
representatives” of collective treaty claims are Indian Act bands, is not lost on
the people that demanded that they be dealt with as a nation in the Treaty
negotiations.48 It is regrettable that courts were not more receptive to the nature
of the claims and who the plaintifs were and were less concerned about costs
orders against these plaintifs. It was true to the adversarial nature of our treaty
partner that they created the divisive “Kelly order” that ostensibly ended the once
in a lifetime treaty litigation of the Grand Council Treaty 3.

VII.NOW AFTER THE DUST HAS SETTLED ON OUR TREATY
LITIGATION
Fast forward to the 140th anniversary of Treaty 3, 3 October 2013, the Minister of
Indian Afairs and other Federal executive representatives including the Governor
General of Canada were invited, in advance, to celebrate the anniversary of

48. Simon J Dawson, Memorandum in Reference to the Indians on the Red River Route
(2 June 1873), Ottawa, Library and Archives Canada (RG 10, vol 1904, fle 2235),
online: <collectionscanada.gc.ca/pam_archives/index.php?fuseaction=genitem.
displayEcopies&lang=eng&rec_nbr=2070938>.
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Treaty 3 between the Queen and the Boundary Waters Anishinaabeg.49 No one
representing Canada bothered to attend.50
Te fact that millions of dollars have been spent on the extraordinary
remedy of litigation in such an unsuccessful strategy is lamentable. Te Bell
Canada dollars from the twenty year agreement are no longer available to fll a
war chest to hunt down treaty breakers. It was a once in a lifetime opportunity
that may have been squandered by our inability to truly create a nation “of one
mind” today. We have a far way to go to decolonize our processes and the road
to treaty implementation. Te transparency and accountability of the litigation
were lost in the way they were managed through the Grand Council Treaty 3.
Te litigation, by necessity, became directed by Chiefs as they were the named
plaintifs within the claims, and the nature of the litigation and strategy required
there to be some confdentiality surrounding these discussions. Tis hurt the
capacity of the nation to truly understand how we were hunting down the treaty
breakers. It was a divide and conquer strategy called colonialism.

VIII.

CONCLUSION

In my lifetime, I am consistently reminded of the rules that govern us
rightly, otherwise known as Miinigoziiwin, that our Creator is given inherent
authority. Literally, Miinigoziiwin means, what the Creator has given us. And,
Mawendopenais explained a key concept to creating law and binding agreements
for our Nation in the fnal statement after agreeing to Treaty 3:51
I stand before the face of the nation and of the Commissioner. I trust there will
be no grumbling. Te words I have said are the words of the nation and have not
been said in secret but openly so all could hear and I trust that those who are not
49. Te Grand Council Treaty 3 is a revitalized traditional government of the Boundary Waters
Anishinaabeg. See for example, the Ogichidag bear clan mark on the Selkirk Treaty of 1817,
and the Ogichidaa’s mark on an 1825 Treaty of Prairie du Chien that involved the United
States of America to set a peace between the “Sioux” and the “Ojibwa” along the Great
Lakes to assist the US fur trade. Te Selkirk Treaty (18 July 1817), online: <www.gov.mb.ca/
chc/archives/hbca/spotlight/selkirk_treaty.html>. Treaty between the United States and the
Chippewa, Sauk, Fox, Menominee, Iowa, Sioux, Winnebago and a portion of the Ottawa,
Chippewa, and Potawatomi Tribes of Indians living upon the Illinois, signed at Prairie des
Chiens in the Territory of Michigan on 19 August 1825, online: <content.wisconsinhistory.
org/cdm/ref/collection/tp/id/55638>.
50. Jon Tompson, “First Nations Still Waiting for Federal Treaty Strategy”, Te
Dryden Observer (10 October 2013), online: <thedrydenobserver.ca/2013/10/10/
frst-nations-still-waiting-for-federal-treaty-strategy>.
51. Keewatin v Ontario, 2011 ONSC 4801 at para 367.
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present will not fnd fault with what we are about to do today. And I trust, what
we are about to do today is for the beneft of our nation as well as for our white
brothers – that nothing but friendship should reign between the nation and our
white brothers…. And now before you all, Indians and whites, let it never be said
that this has been done in secret. It is done openly and in the light of day.

Te CRTF decisions were meant to be better decisions about when treaty
litigation would be funded by the litigation war chest. In hindsight, there was not
a complete understanding about how to be more inclusive in the instructions and
decision-making during the litigation amongst the Treaty 3 communities.
Treaties are about relationships, I argue, they are not meant to create winners
and losers. Te mutual benefts and the peace that resulted are the attraction to
treaty relationships. Te fact that Canada is not mired in Indigenous-led violence
is a testament to the strength and endurance of our treaty relationships and sacred
obligations to those treaty orders that were created. Not that the Anishinaabe
of the Boundary Waters were unaccustomed to using warfare to protect their
interests. We had constant struggles in our border-relationships caused by
earlier settler coercion, namely the American and British fur trade. We fought
vigorously to be the “middle-men” in this fur trade and our “Sioux-Ojibway”
disputes in Minnesota are central to that state’s early violent history of settlement
there.52 Tere is also a very long-lasting peace that is in the collective memory of
Indigenous peoples known as the Great Peace or the Great Law of Peace in and
around the Great Lakes prior to any European contact. Tis peace was unsettled by
the European settlement in the eastern shores of the United States moving inland.
Treaties have a more special place in Canadian law than they are presently
aforded. Tere is a misunderstanding in the common law that treaties are
between the small Indian Act bands that may beneft from them today. Te fact
is, Treaty 3 was a nation-to-nation treaty that allowed the east-west expansion of
Canada into the west, and only the parties themselves should be able to change
their own legal position vis-à-vis the treaty relationship, through consent or
negotiated agreement.
In R v Sioui, the Supreme Court of Canada has determined that treaties
cannot be extinguished unilaterally by agreement between colonial powers:53
It would be contrary to the general principles of law for an agreement concluded
between the English and the French to extinguish a treaty concluded between the
English and the Hurons. It must be remembered that a treaty is a solemn agreement
between the Crown and the Indians, an agreement the nature of which is sacred:
52. Mainville, “Treaty Councils,” supra note 1.
53. R v Sioui, [1990] 1 SCR 1025 at 1063.
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Simon, supra, at p. 410, and White and Bob, supra, at p. 649. Te very defnition
of a treaty thus makes it impossible to avoid the conclusion that a treaty cannot be
extinguished without the consent of the Indians concerned. Since the Hurons had
the capacity to enter into a treaty with the British, therefore, they must be the only
ones who could give the necessary consent to its extinguishment.

Te logical conclusion to treaty disputes is that the parties are required to
resolve them through mutual agreement. No Canadian court has the powers and
authorities to unilaterally change their terms or to do damage to the solemn,
honourable reconciliation achieved between the parties over a century ago. What
will be an important solution within these disputes is to allow Indigenous law and
institutions of Indigenous law to participate in the resolution of these disputes
and balancing the relationship with Crown governments.
And, what has happened to the Queen’s ear? We know it is literally still
available, but is it practically, no longer available to the Anishinaabe Nation?
What would be the modern equivalent from Canada’s executive government
of the government’s ear? I have argued this already in a much-earlier article
on treaty councils.54 Tat was a decade ago, and very little has happened to
begin a dialogue on what a treaty council would need to make it an acceptable
treaty-based, fact-fnding, and dispute resolution mechanism. John Borrows
shared this understanding almost twenty years ago, about treaty councils 55
Tey believe that power was to be shared, and decisions about the treaties’ meanings
were to be resolved through further treaty councils. Courts could take guidance
from this perspective when faced with disputes over the meaning of treaties and send
the parties back to peace and friendship councils to resolve their diferences through
negotiation and agreement.

Does this fully explain why the Anishinaabe continue to hold fast to Treaty 3?
Unmistakably, the Anishinaabe Nation drove a hard bargain, it took more
than three years and as many attempts to create an agreement known as Treaty
3. Our existing relationship with the British, the Dawson Road annuity, and
our relatives having a better treaty in Minnesota than the Lake Superior-based
Anishinaabe had in Canada, informed our treaty discussions. An important
development that we fashioned was our own version of terms to create an 1869
“list of demands” much like the Queen’s representatives pre-fashioned terms
in the “Articles of a Treaty” that was drafted in 1871. Te Anishinaabe would

54. Mainville, “Treaty Councils,” supra note 1.
55. John Borrows, “Domesticating Doctrines: Aboriginal Peoples and the Royal Commission on
Aboriginal Peoples” (2001) 46 McGill LJ 615 at 630.

MAINvIlle, A lAsTING RelATIoNshIP wITh CANADA 125

defnitely agree that the 1869 demands were not Treaty 3, and that the “Articles
of Treaty” were not the treaty either.
How novel would it have been to have demanded not just a parchment
copy of the treaty as Chief Powassin and others had done after the treaty was
concluded, but also that the treaty be written in their language as a record of
the agreement in Anishinaabemowin? Te only Anishinaabemowin record was
kept by the Anishinaabe “recorder” a person entrusted with the capacity to
understand the full oral agreement in Anishinaabemowin, and he was given the
responsibility to retell the various terms to the Grand Council into the future.
An interesting symbolic act of reconciliation would be for both Nations to
attempt to work together to establish the ofcial treaty record in both English
and Anishinaabemowin, the impossibility of this would almost seem self-evident.
If we cannot do this now, and I would argue even now this is an impossibility,
why do people suppose or presume that this was achieved in 1873? Is it acceptable
that Indigenous law and jurisdiction is also a “living tree” and treaties are rooted
in the terms agreed to 1873, but created in symbolic language to ensure that
the treaty relationship would last, “as long as the sun shines, the river fow, and
the grasses grow, that is to say, forever.” Te living trees would be fed by the
interpretative difculties, meeting together to come to a mutual understanding
for today, then again in future years, and so on.
A sui generis dispute resolution court could be the counter-balancing force
that the former promise to “hunt down” treaty breakers was in 1873. Articles
27 and 37 of UNDRIP are helpful in beginning that important treaty-based
discussion on a truly nation-to-nation basis.
Given the practical reality that a true written record of the terms of this
treaty does not exist, why is it legally acceptable to bring a treaty such as Treaty
3 to a Canadian court? Courts have been eager to convince themselves of the
“principles of interpretation” found in common law,56 and that a principled
approach by common law judges would equalize the interpretative difculties.
Te result is winners and losers. Te adversarial system, some might even argue,
would aford the parties a truly “fair” forum to advocate for various interpretations
and fndings within the treaty itself. Tis is all outside of treaty-based dispute
resolution to the detriment of the original understandings and the potential

56. R v Marshall, [1999] 3 SCR 456 at para 78.
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actual agreement (or historic reconciliation) of 1873.57 To conclude, I want to
share that the Anishinaabe refer to treaty between us and the Queen as “Manidoo
Mazina’igan” which means the sacred paper. I doubt this is just the Articles of
Treaty, given our long legacy of protecting the Paypom Treaty, our knowledge of
the Nolin Notes and the “We have Kept our Part of the Treaty” document that
lists the many treaty grievances by subject matter. Te sacred paper is part of the
dispute resolution between us, the ingredients of a mutual understanding over the
long history of our treaty relationship. We still strive for peace and understanding
and the lasting friendship promised in 1873. Tat we can share all that is fne and
good between us.

57. As a practicing lawyer, I am presently working with both Aboriginal law informed by
Anishinaabe Inakonigaawin, and helping my clients assert original inherent jurisdiction
as their jurisdiction and staying away from delegations of Canadian legal authority as
contingent jurisdiction. My strongest belief about Treaty 3 is that we insisted that our
laws, “the rules that govern us rightly,” would continue to be co-existing jurisdiction in
our territory. To that end, I am greatly interested in how law in Canada is required to be
reconciliatory, and how judges can be trained to be better in helping in that purpose. See
e.g. Mark D Walters, “Te Judicial Recognition of Indigenous Legal Traditions: Connolly v
Woolrich at 150” (2017) 22 Rev Const Stud 374 at 376:
Indigenous law is acknowledged not because it has been incorporated within another law,
or because it has been impliedly (or expressly) accepted or sanctioned by a sovereign king or
parliament, but rather because it is one of many bodies of law that can be shown to ft together
in a manner that best refects the equal moral imperative of a normative order.

